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Introduction 
 
Arguably the most contentious topic in international finance is the issue of financial liberalization. This 
has been defined to include the adoption of the following policies: market-determined interest rates; 
greater ease of entry into the banking sector to encourage competition; the elimination of directed 
credit programmes; reduced fiscal dependence of the state on credit from the banking system (to allow 
for greater expansion of credit to the private sector); the integration of formal and informal markets, 
and; a movement towards equilibrium exchange rates and eventually flexible exchange rate regimes 
with open capital accounts1. This issue has divided researchers and experts across countries. Even 
within the International Monetary Fund, an institution widely criticized for promoting financial sector 
liberalization, there are divisions. Along these lines, it has been asserted thus: 
 
Few issues have attracted as much controversy as the removal of controls on international capital 
flows—a process known as capital account liberalization. The International Monetary Fund has 
been at the centre of this controversy. The formal rules of the IMF provide member states with the 
right to use capital controls, and these rules have not changed significantly since the organization 
was founded in 1945. But informally, among many staff within the Fund in the 1980s and 1990s, 
capital controls, once part of economic orthodoxy, became identified as an economic heresy. 
Although liberalization was not encouraged indiscriminately, the belief that the free movement of 
capital was desirable—what I call the norm of capital freedom—became the new orthodoxy2. 
 
In recent times, this issue has again been brought to the fore especially in the context of developing 
countries, which are arguably believed to have borne the brunt of such policies3. The adoption of 
financial liberalization policies by many developing countries, for instance, has led to banking sector 
instability and fragility4. Along these lines, it has been noted thus: 
 
Over the course of the last fifteen years, Mexico, Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea, 
Indonesia, Russia, Turkey and Argentina have all been struck by financial crises. Two 
remarkable characteristics of this recent phenomenon include the “developing” status of the 
affected countries and the fact that their respective crises have tended to coincide with 
financial liberalization measures. Such reforms allowed international investors seeking high 
returns the freedom to invest in high risk developing economies5.  
 
Based on the above, it is clear that most developing countries that went through the agonizing 
financial liberalization reform process have been unable to enjoy the promised benefits in general, and 
                                                     
1 See Serieux (2008, p.5). See also Hubler et al (2008, p.395-6) and Reinhart and Tokadlidis (2000, p.5). For our purposes 
therefore, financial sector liberalization will include capital account liberalization. It has been explained that “in a fully liberalized 
capital account regime, banks and corporations are allowed to borrow abroad fully. They may need to inform the authorities but 
permission is granted almost automatically. Reserve requirements might be in place but are lower than 10 percent. Also, there 
are no special exchange rates for either the current account or the capital account transactions; nor are there any restrictions to 
capital outflows” (Arestis and Caner, 2004, p. 2).  
2 Chwieroth (2010, p.1).  
3 The usual practice in such jurisdictions is to use the banking sector as a proxy for the entire financial system. This is so 
because In such jurisdictions, the banking industry have always dominated the financial system, It has for instance been 
asserted that:  “A key stylised fact about financial systems in developing countries is that they are dominated by commercial 
banks…. Assets of insurance and pension companies are minuscule in most developing countries. Development financial 
institutions such as agricultural and development banks are also small compared with the commercial banks. Commercial bond 
markets are typically thin and government bond markets are often used only by captive buyers obliged to hold such bonds to 
satisfy liquidity ratio requirements or to bid for government contracts. Although equity markets are sizeable in several developing 
countries, their role in the process of financial intermediation between the household and business sectors remains small” (Fry, 
1997, p.754).  
4 See Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998, p.5. 
5 Charette (Undated, pp.1-2).  
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the promised financial sector prosperity in particular6. Although financial liberalization can contribute to 
economic development, the openness of financial markets in developing countries that adopt this 
policy also makes such countries more vulnerable to financial disruptions7. 
 
It is in the light of the above that there is need to rethink the entire concept of financial liberalization 
and its applicability to developing countries. In other to achieve the above objective, this paper is 
divided into three parts. Part One critiques the origins and structure of financial liberalization and 
documents the various concerns of developing countries about financial liberalization. Part Two 
critiques the above concerns in the context of the specificities and experiences of the developing 
countries while Part Three concludes the paper.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
6 Geda, 2006, p.4.  
7 Ito, 2006, p.303. 
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Origins of Financial Liberalization  
 
Historically, the conventional wisdom in finance was that financial sector liberalization was unsuitable 
for developing countries. This point was perhaps best made by Gashenkron in his description of 
industrialization in 19th Century Russia.  According to him:  
 
The scarcity of capital in Russia was such that no banking system could conceivably succeed in 
attracting sufficient funds to finance large scale industrialization; the standards of honesty in 
business were so disastrously low, the general distrust of the public so great that no bank could 
have hoped to attract even such small capital funds as were available, and no bank could have 
successfully engaged in long term credit policies in an economy where fraudulent bankruptcy had 
been almost elevated to the rank of a general business practice. Supply of capital for the needs of 
industrialization required the compulsory machinery of the government, which, through its 
taxation policies, succeeded in directing incomes from consumption to investments. There is no 
doubt that the Government as an ogens movens of industrialization discharged its role in a far 
less that efficient manner. Incompetence and corruption of bureaucracy were great. The amount 
of waste that accompanied the process was formidable. But when all is said and done, the great 
success of the policies pursued… were undeniable8. 
 
Despite the numerous backward and administrative negatives in such backward countries, state 
intervention remained arguably the most viable option for the promotion of economic development in 
backward countries. The notion that liberalization of the financial system was sufficient to tackle the 
structural deficiencies of such economies was therefore unviable at the time. Furthermore, 
Gershenkron did not consider the financial system as the most important ingredient in promoting 
economic development in backward countries. According to him, a disciplined and well trained labour 
force was the most important factor in this process9. The issue of financial liberalization was therefore 
secondary.  
 
Gershenkron’s work however described a period when most of the developed economies had internal 
opportunities for the investment of capital and profits. International capital flows was therefore not an 
issue. Around the period therefore, the major academic debate in this direction was on the relationship 
between financial development and economic growth10. The above debates led to calls for more 
empirical and theoretical research on the subject matter. Along these lines, it was, in 1966 asserted 
thus: 
 
An observed characteristic of the process of economic development over time, in a market 
oriented economy, using the price mechanism to allocate resources, is an increase in the number 
and variety of financial institutions and a substantial rise in the proportion not only of money but 
also of the total of all financial assets relative to GDP and to tangible wealth…. However the 
causal nature of this relationship between financial development and economic growth has not 
been fully explored either theoretically or empirically11. 
 
All these however changed in the 1970s with the emergence of petrodollars mainly from the Gulf 
States looking for investment outlets. This was as a result of the quadrupling of oil prices in the early 
1970s. The consequence of the above was that several western banks were awash with petrodollars. 
Ironically, the same oil price hikes which led to the emergence of the petrodollars also triggered a 
                                                     
8 Gerschenkron (1962, pp. 19-20).  
9 “But the overriding fact to consider is that industrial labor in the sense of a stable, reliable, and disciplined group that has cut 
the umbilical cord connecting it with the land and has become suitable for utilization in factories is not abundant but extremely 
scarce in a backward country. Creation of an industrial labor force that really deserves its name is a more difficult and protracted 
process” (Gerschenkron, 1962, p.9).  
10 Arestis (2003, pp. 2-3).   
11 Patrick (1966, p.174).   
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recession in some parts of the West. The consequence of this was that several Western banks began 
to look for investment opportunities for their petrodollars in the developing world. It is for instance now 
well established that these petrodollars were at the roots of the Latin American debt crisis in the 
1980s12. A less well known consequence of the emergence of petrodollars is the fact that it led to 
pressures for developing countries to adopt financial liberalization policies. This no doubt was to help 
create investment opportunities for idle petrodollars in Western banks in these developing countries.  
 
It was perhaps no coincidence that the theoretical arguments for financial sector liberalization were 
developed at about the same time. Specifically, it was at this stage that the issue of financial 
liberalization, which is an exposition of the theory which suggests that financial development drives 
economic growth, became prominent. Excess capital in the mainly mature economies of developed 
countries needed investment outlets in less developed countries. Liberalizing the international financial 
system to allow for free capital and financial flows therefore suited the agenda of western banks and 
western governments at the time13.  
 
The two most important studies that advanced the above argument were developed independently in 
1973 by Ronald McKinnon and Edward Shaw. Their views have come to be known as the McKinnon-
Shaw hypothesis of Financial Liberalization. The foundation of this theory is the belief that the formal 
financial systems of developing countries are generally repressed with the consequence that the 
majority of its citizens and businesses are forced to seek financial assistance from outside the formal 
banking sector. This has been explained thus: 
 
Organized banking has a sorry record in penetrating the hinterland of less developed countries 
(LDCs), in serving rural areas in general, and in serving small borrowers in particular. Bank credit 
remains a financial appendage of certain enclaves: exclusively licensed import activities, 
specialized large scale mineral exports, highly protected manufacturing, large international 
corporations, and various government agencies, such as coffee marketing boards or publicly 
controlled utilities. Even ordinary government deficits on current accounts frequently preempt the 
limited lending resources of the deposit banks. Financing of the rest of the economy must be met 
from the meager resources of money lenders, pawnbrokers and cooperatives. It is this 
phenomenon that I call “financial repression”14. 
 
Financial repression has been popular in developing countries for three main reasons. First, there is a 
natural instinct in such countries to prohibit usury. Arguably the best known proponent of this view is 
Maynard Keynes who argued that interest rates are not self adjusting at a level best suited for the 
social advantage but constantly tends to rise too high. It is therefore necessary for governments to 
curb it by statute or custom15. The problem with the above view however is that it tends to avoid 
tackling the real reasons behind interest rate hikes which is normally inflation. Under such scenarios, 
credit ceilings which naturally lead to credit rationing simply create arbitrage opportunities for the 
financial institutions operatives allocating the credit to make private profits. The fact that the entire 
informal sector and most small businesses in developing countries extensively rely on informal credits 
                                                     
12 “The debts were contracted in the 1970s when Northern banks were flush with petrodollars. These flowed mainly from 
countries in the Middle East whose coffers were bulging as a consequence of a fourfold hike in oil prices. Naturally, commercial 
banks sought every opportunity to invest the money and, in the process, make a hefty profit. The investment climate was not 
bright in northern countries, especially Europe, as increased energy costs had triggered a recession. Undeterred the First World 
banks looked South to the Third World as a favourable location for their investment. Governments in the Third World, urged on 
by Northern consultants from institutions like the World Bank, judged it a favourable time to borrow. Interest rates were low. 
Borrowing cheap money seemed to be an eminently reasonable way of undertaking much needed development. Unfortunately 
things went badly wrong. In the early 1980s the foreign debts mushroomed out of control” (Columban Missionaries, 2010).  
13 More recently, it has been suggested that: “In reality, the move towards financial liberalisation has been prompted by the 
private financial institutions (such as investment and commercial banks, mutual funds, hedge funds). They have campaigned for 
the removal of national barriers so that they can shift their huge funds from country to country to obtain the maximum profits 
from speculating or investing in currencies and shares and to earn higher returns for providing loans. At present the equivalent 
of two trillion American dollars is shifted across borders EVERY DAY. Almost all of this (98 percent) is not related to trade or 
direct long-term investment, but comprises short-term capital funds” (Khor, 1998).  
14 McKinnon, 1973, pp.68-9. 
15 Quoted in Shaw, 1973, p.92. 
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which are normally obtained at sometimes very high interest rates clearly show that financial 
repression has in no way improved the credit costs of the majority of citizens and businesses in 
developing countries. 
 
A second reason for the popularity of financial repression in backward countries is the general belief 
that such countries do not have the discipline to control their nominal money. This makes it impossible 
for financial deepening to take place in such economies. Along these lines, it has been asserted thus:  
 
Real financial growth or deepening does not occur unless nominal money is under effective constraint 
or unless inflationary effects of monetary indiscipline are compensated by changes in relative prices 
including especially interest rates and foreign exchange rates. Uncompensated expansion of nominal 
money, we know, is a tax on real balances, and rational holders of financial assets evade the tax by 
shifting to forms of wealth that are less vulnerable16. 
 
While the above assertion is no doubt correct, financial repression may not be the best option in 
engendering economic development in such backward territories17. It had little success in the many 
developing countries where it had been widely practiced. Perhaps more important is the fact that the 
indiscipline that makes backward states unable to control their money supply is a major impediment to 
economic development itself.  
 
The third reason for the popularity of financial repression in developing countries is the widespread 
belief that financial deepening is an ineffective developmental strategy because it is expensive in 
terms of scarce factors of production. Specifically it is argued that backward countries do not have the 
requisite skills or regulatory structures to police such liberalized financial systems. Furthermore, 
another argument in support of the point is the intuitive view that market forces do not work in 
backward countries. Although this may be true, the reality is that financial repression plays a major 
role in distorting market forces in such economies. Perhaps more troubling is the fact that perverse 
financial repression in backward countries has been unable to contain the expansion of the informal 
credit markets which is the major life line of informal and small businesses. It has also been unable to 
fuel economic development in several of such countries18. 
 
Based on the above, it is not surprising that the theory of financial liberalization is based on the belief 
that the informal financial system, which is perverse in developing countries are less efficient than 
banks in undertaking the intermediation function. By removing credit ceilings, which is usually a 
dominant characteristic of financial repression, and allowing market forces to determine interest rates, 
banks are better able to attract deposits from the unproductive cash holdings, less productive self 
investments and inflation hedges to the official banking sector which will intermediate these funds to 
the more productive industrial sector. 
 
Not all scholars however agree with the above view. Scholars of the neo structuralism mode for 
instance, argue that the official banking sector is less efficient than the financial markets outside 
(informal financial sector), which operates in a liberalized fashion, in intermediating financial 
resources. The above view is based on the assumption that the informal credit market provides 
                                                     
16 Please note that although growth in nominal money may be essential for economic progress, it is not the only condition 
necessary. In fact, such growth, if excessive, could inhibit economic development by reducing real money and sacrificing the 
income, savings, investments, employment and distribution effects of real money. See Shaw (1973, pp.95 and 102).  
17 The consequences of financial repression include: administered low nominal interest rates often resulting in negative real 
rates; small and oligopolistic financial sectors relative to the size of the economy dominated by intermediation in short term 
financial assets; dual economies with capital intensive modern sectors served by cheap foreign exchange and low interest 
finance and labour intensive traditional sectors left to be served by informal finance; large government deficits; and low savings 
and investment rates and retarded economic growth (Serieux, 2008, p.3). 
18 Shaw, 1973, p.p.92-107. 
FINANCIAL SECTOR LIBERALIZATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 6 
complete intermediation while the formal banking sector does not because of stringent reserve 
requirements19.  
 
Despite the above divergent views on the efficiency of the formal and informal financial sectors in the 
intermediation process, it has rightly been pointed out that there is no material difference in these two 
positions with respect to the core issue of liberalizing the financial system. Along these lines, it has 
been asserted thus:  
 
In essence, these seemingly opposing groups argue for the same objective: financial 
liberalization. They differ not on financial liberalization itself, but on the method of financial 
liberalization. That difference originates in their different perceptions of the efficiency of different 
financial submarkets in developing countries. So the real issue is not whether developing 
countries should liberalize the financial system. It is whether informal credit markets in developing 
countries are more efficient than the banking sector. This issue can be narrowed down to: (a) 
whether informal credit markets in developing countries really provide full intermediation or, at 
least, more intermediation than the banks; and (b) whether the allocation of funds through 
informal credit markets is as efficient as that through banks20. 
 
Financial liberalization is however more complex than liberalizing interest rates. As earlier mentioned, 
it also includes, liberalizing entry into the banking sector and capital account liberalization. Although 
international financial institutions and most developed countries fully support interest rate liberalization, 
as a total package however, there is no general agreement as to the utility value of such liberalizations 
in developing countries. Empirical studies on this subject matter have not been conclusive.21 Despite 
the above, it is not surprising that western banks and governments have always pushed for financial 
sector liberalization in developing countries. This is because such liberalization facilitates the 
investments of western businesses in such emerging economies.  
 
The IMF, although controlled by the developed countries of the West has however adopted a more 
cautious approach to especially capital account liberalization in developing countries. This has 
sometimes frustrated Western powers. Along these lines, it has been asserted thus:  
 
Capital account liberalization also remains an important concern of some governments. The 
European Union (EU) and the United States view liberalization as one of their top policy priorities; 
with Brussels pushing for it in the context of accession negotiations, and Washington insisting 
upon it in recent trade agreements with Chile, Singapore, and South Korea, as well as in its 
ongoing “strategic dialogue” with China. But the EU and U.S. positions have, on occasion, 
diverged from the IMF’s approach, thus revealing important aspects of the political economy of 
the organization. For instance, in the context of Bulgaria’s and Romania’s accession negotiations, 
the IMF recommended the maintenance of selective controls, while EU officials opposed them. 
Similarly, the United States and the IMF have clashed over the need for China to liberalize its 
capital account. While the United States, in seeking to intensify pressure on the Chinese currency 
to appreciate, argues that China should liberalize more rapidly, some IMF staff members claim 
that China should slow down its liberalization until it strengthens its financial system and achieves 
greater exchange rate flexibility22. 
 
Exercising caution on the issue of capital account liberalization was no doubt the right thing to do. This 
is especially so given the fact that this issue is yet to be fully understood even within the IMF. This 
point has been explicitly conceded by the Managing Director of the IMF.23 Despite this fact, capital 
                                                     
19 Cho, 1990, p.477. 
20 Cho, 1990, p.478. 
21 See, for instance, Kiyota et al (2007).  
22 Chwieroth (2010, p.10).  
23 “Financial globalization has both caused and been caused by the liberalization of the capital account. However, capital 
account liberalization has also brought macroeconomic and financial challenges that require careful management, including the 
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account liberalization policies were forced on several developing countries under the guise of 
structural adjustments in the 1980s and 1990s. This was arguably because such countries lacked both 
clout and skill in these negotiations process. It is also unlikely that such pressures for capital account 
liberalization in developing countries would abet in the near future. According to the Report of an 
International Conference on the subject matter:  
 
[f]or better or worse, the forces driving the movement towards greater capital account 
convertibility are not likely to diminish –barring a profound upheaval in the global economy- in the 
foreseeable future. The Mexican crisis of 1994, the Asian crisis of 1997-1998 and crises in Brazil 
and Russia has led many observers to question the stability of the global financial system, but 
none has resulted in any fundamental change in the underlying process. Instead…. The policy 
debate has increasingly centred around the institutional and macroeconomic frameworks that 
must be put in place to limit the exposure of developing countries to sudden capital flow 
reversals24. 
 
Other concerns of developing countries with respect to financial liberalization in general include the 
following:  
 
• The belief that liberalization will lead to the neglect of small businesses and the informal 
sector in the credit allocation process.  
• The belief that liberalization will be detrimental to domestic deposit mobilization 
especially in the rural areas.  
• Financial liberalization would threaten the development of the local financial institutions 
given the fact that foreign banks have more capital, more experience and better 
reputations. 
• The belief that foreign banks may serve as conduits for the outflow of capital through 
money or capital market transactions to the detriment of the capital account of a 
country. 
• The belief that the local regulatory agencies are not well equipped to police the 
complexities of the operations of foreign banks 25. 
 
In the next section, we will examine the efficacy of the above concerns in the context of the 
experiences of developing countries with financial sector liberalization.  
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                      
orderly sequencing of liberalization with reforms in other areas, especially in the financial system. At times, these challenges 
have made for a disorderly process, as some controls are taken off and others are re-imposed to tackle various pressures. Yet 
there is no solid body of analysis on how best to proceed. This is a challenge to which the Fund must rise” (IMF, 2005, P.8). 
24 Schneider (2000, p. 3). 
25 Kiyota et al (2007, pp. 14-15).  
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Financial Liberalization in Developing Countries: A Critique  
 
Financial liberalization in several developing countries dates back to the colonial period. In most of the 
former colonies, foreign banks reigned supreme. In the entire British Africa, for instance, it was only in 
Nigeria that indigenous banks emerged during the colonial era. Even at that, such banks were small in 
terms of market size, when compared with the operations of foreign banks26. Their market also 
differed from those of the foreign banks. While for instance, foreign banks were established to service 
British colonial and commercial interests, indigenous banks mainly focused on the interests of 
Africans27.  
 
Unfortunately, most of these indigenous banks were poorly capitalized, poorly staffed and poorly 
managed. The consequence of the above was that the colonial government was forced to introduce 
some basic regulations for banks in Nigeria. This led to the indigenous banking failures of 1952 and 
1953. In fact, the few indigenous banks that survived did so because of Government support. This 
marked the beginning of government involvement in commercial banking in Nigeria28.  
 
It was not until 1972 that the Nigerian Government decided to indigenize foreign banking operations in 
the country. The reason given for this was in order to help fund its wider interests in indigenizing 
several foreign businesses. By, 1976, the Federal Government had acquired controlling shares in all 
foreign banks in the country. This certainly did not augur well for the proper development of the 
financial system. Rather, it decimated the ability of these commercial banks, which are naturally 
allergic to inflation, to serve as a check on government fiscal indiscipline and their inflationary 
consequences. Government control of majority of the commercial banks therefore oiled financial 
repression. 
 
It was however not until 1986 after the Nigerian economy began to show serious signs of weaknesses 
that the government under pressure from the IMF and the World Bank decided to introduce a 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and deregulate the Nigerian economy. Financial liberalization 
was central to this programme. For instance, the main strategies of the programme were: the adoption 
of a market determined exchange rate for the Naira, the deregulation of external trade and payments 
arrangements and reductions in price and administrative controls. A consequence of the above 
measures was the phenomenal increase in the number of financial institutions in operation in the 
country. The number of commercial and merchant banks, for instance rose from 41 in 1985 to 120 in 
199329. 
 
Unfortunately, financial liberalization failed to achieve its anticipated benefits in Nigeria. Rather it led to 
financial fragility and financial system distress. In 1998 alone, for instance, 26 banking licenses were 
withdrawn by the Central Bank of Nigeria30. The reason for this has been explained thus:  
 
The pattern of liberalization in Nigeria’s financial sector produced a chaotic speculative bubble, 
with disastrous consequences for the banking industry and the wider economy. Deregulation led 
to a tripling of banks over a five year period along with an explosion of unregulated non bank 
financial institutions. A large magnitude of scarce capital and professional talent flowed to the 
banking sector. Huge profits accumulated through foreign exchange and interest rate arbitrage, 
as well as through brazen fraud. The frenzy was aggravated by changes in the foreign exchange 
regime, erratic regulation, and precipitous fiscal and monetary expansion. Despite the 
introduction of a prudential framework along with other legal and organizational changes, the 
                                                     
26 Uche (1997b and 2010b). 
27 See Uche (1997a, 1997) and Austin and Uche (2007).  
28 Uche (1997a; 1997b; and 2010b)  
29 See, for instance, Uche (1996, 1999 and 2001). 
30 Ogowewo and Uche, 2006, p.170.   
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financial system completely overwhelmed the regulatory institutions deployed by the 
government31. 
 
It is however important to note that the Nigerian banking system was even after financial liberalization, 
still dominated by local banks. The failure of banking liberalization therefore had little to do with foreign 
banking operations and more to do with the inability of the Government to adhere to any form of fiscal 
discipline and provide a stable macroeconomic environment for such liberalizations to yield positive 
economic results. The above point was reiterated by a former Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria 
who publicly complained thus:  
 
The greatest problem which has severely constrained the effectiveness of monetary and banking 
policies in Nigeria in the last few years has been the persistence of large government deficits and 
their mandatory financing by the CBN.  The financing of government deficits by the CBN 
increases the monetary base and the level of excess liquidity of the banking system. A related 
problem in the mandatory role of the CBN is the underwriting of primary issues of government 
security thereby constraining the CBN’s ability to regulate reserves32.  
 
The case for the majority of developing countries, several of which were former colonies of European 
countries was however not much different. Like Nigeria, the financial systems of several of such 
countries were historically dominated by foreign banks. Unlike Nigeria, most of these countries never 
nationalized foreign banking interests. Despite this, their various experiments with financial 
liberalization yielded mixed results. We shall critique the various reasons often cited by anti financial 
liberalization experts as the underlying factors behind the failure of financial liberalization in the context 
of developing countries. 
 
1. The belief that liberalization will lead to the neglect of small businesses and the informal 
sector in the credit allocation process.  
 
This is no doubt a very important concern that is rooted in the history of the development of the 
financial systems in several developing countries. It is for instance, a fact that historically, it was never 
the objective of foreign banks to facilitate the economic activities of former colonies. The consequence 
of this was that several of such countries, businesses, especially the small ones had to devise various 
informal and expensive mechanisms for obtaining credit. In Ceylon (Sri Lanka) for example, the 
Banking Commissioners in their report of 1934 concluded that:  
 
It was considered essential for the attainment of this goal of economic freedom that he public 
should have adequate financial assistance, so as to enable indigenous capital and enterprise to 
participate more actively in the trade and industries of the country and, in par5icular, to cultivate 
and expand the home markets in preference to the export markets. The prevailing banking 
system primarily designed to foster economic development by requisitioning the aid of non-
indigenous capital and enterprise proved to be ill adapted, by the very nature of its structure, to 
offer such facilities33. 
 
In the case of Nigeria, the Government has long recognized the fact that it was difficult for formal bank 
credit to flow to small businesses and rural businesses and have responded with a plethora of 
regulations and schemes which have included: the rural banking scheme, Community banking 
scheme, sectoral allocation of credit directives, and establishment of a Peoples Bank directed solely at 
                                                     
31 Lewis and Stein, 1997, p.17. 
32 Ogwuma, 1993, p.156.  
33 Report of the Ceylon Banking Commission (1934, para 4).  
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small businesses34. A common characteristic of all the above schemes is that they all, without 
exception, failed to achieve their objectives.  
 
The fear that liberalization will lead to the neglect of small businesses and the informal sector in the 
credit allocation process is therefore overstated. To properly gauge the risk, one must consider it in the 
context of the present reality. Even before liberalization, rural credit provided immense difficulties for 
formal financial institutions. Government intervention in this sector also failed. Dismissing liberalization 
and its positive benefits on the above grounds is therefore illogical. What will be useful if the credit 
needs of small businesses and rural businesses are to be met is for governments in developing 
countries to rethink their development strategies for these sectors. Poor infrastructural facilities like 
roads, electricity, portable water and security are the central causes of poor economic activities for 
small and rural businesses. Addressing these will no doubt change the dynamics of getting financial 
institutions to willingly extend credit to such businesses. Interestingly, the World Bank has argued that 
financial liberalization will benefit small businesses. This is so because the indigenous banks will find it 
difficult to compete with the big foreign banks. Given the above, they will have little choice but to 
specialize in small businesses. Although there is some sense in the above position, it is doubtful 
whether these local banks will succeed if the above structural problems are not addressed.  
 
2. The belief that liberalization would be detrimental to domestic deposit mobilization 
especially in the rural area.  
 
This concern is also unfounded. From experience, it is clear that that liberalization has always led to 
increased competition in deposit mobilization by banks. In fact, rural deposits have increasingly 
become the target of formal banks in financially liberalized settings. In Nigeria, for instance, private 
banks have devised schemes of creaming off such savings through community banks/ microfinance 
banks35. 
 
From the above, it is clear that financial liberalization has led to increased intermediation of rural 
savings. The major problem however with such arrangements is that rural savings end up being 
invested in urban areas. The Nigerian Government was no doubt very keen to prevent such a 
scenario. It’s enabling laws for the rural banking scheme and community banking scheme, for 
instance, all had provisions for a sizeable portion of savings from localities to be utilized in such 
localities. These were always flouted by financial institutions mainly because the macro economic 
environment for rural and small business operations was very harsh. It therefore made economic 
sense for such local financial institutions to invest rural deposits in commercial banks which in turn 
invest these as loans to big businesses. In fact most of these micro finance institutions considered it 
financially prudent to pay the penalties for breaking government local investment rules rather than lend 
to local businesses operating under harsh infrastructural environment. Such problems would no doubt 
be less severe in developing countries with better rural infrastructure in place. In such jurisdictions, 
small businesses will no doubt have a better record of performance. 
 
3. Financial liberalization would threaten the development of the local financial institutions 
given the fact that foreign banks have more capital, more experience and better reputations. 
 
The benefits and costs of foreign banking entry are well documented in the financial literature. Benefits 
of such entries include:  
• By engendering competition, it increases the efficiency of the domestic banking sector;  
• It improves the mechanism for credit allocation to the private sector. This is so because the 
evaluation and pricing of credit risks become more sophisticated;  
                                                     
34 See, for instance, Uche (1998, 1999 and 2007).  
35 See Uche (1998). 
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• It helps to build a domestic banking, supervisory and legal framework and foster overall 
transparency;  
• Linkages of the foreign banks with the international markets and parent banks enables it to 
provide more stable sources of credit;  
• foreign banks may reduce the costs associated with recapitalizing and restructuring in a post 
crisis periods 
 
On the other hand, potential costs of such foreign bank entrance include:  
• local banks may be forced to take more risks because of reduced franchise value 
• Increased foreign bank presence mat impair access to credit to some sectors of the economy. 
• Because of their more advanced service and product delivery mechanisms, foreign banks 
crème off the most lucrative businesses from local banks.  
• Foreign banks may increase financial instability by pulling out of host countries or by 
contagion from problems in home countries.  
• The lending patterns of foreign banks tend to ignore local priorities because such banks have 
different focus36. 
 
Theoretically, the above concern makes sense. It is for instance, well established in the literature that 
foreign banks have better skills, more capital, more experience and better reputations. Such banks are 
therefore likely to be more efficient and better managed than local banks. In the context of financial 
liberalization in several developing countries however, some of the above fears are overstated. This is 
in part because, historically, as has already been argued, several of such countries have been 
dominated by foreign banks. Financial liberalization can therefore provide no material additional risks 
to the possible concerns stated above.  
 
Even in developing countries like Nigeria, Ethiopia and Tanzania which are all notable exceptions 
where local banks still dominate the financial systems, some of the above concerns still exist. As has 
already been stated, access to credit by small and rural businesses in Nigeria, for instance, has 
always been impeded. All the special programmes devised by the government to address the above 
problem failed. In Tanzania, the extensive Government control of the banking sector which was aimed 
at engendering economic growth and development have since failed. Along these lines, it has been 
asserted thus:  
 
In Tanzania, poor performance of the state-owned financial sector in late 1980s forced the 
government to search for new policy directions. NPLs were above 65 percent of the loan portfolio, 
fiscal and financial operations were not separated, and the appropriate regulatory framework was 
missing. In 1990, a special Presidential Commission recommended: (1) increased competition by 
encouraging entry of foreign banks; (ii) strengthening the existing financial institutions; (iii) 
developing management accountability; and (iv) Recovering NPLs. Based on these, the 
Government has issued a policy statement on financial sector reform with the aim of creating a 
market-based financial system, efficient in mobilizing and allocating resources and supporting 
long term economic growth37. 
 
Perhaps more important is the fact that it has been established that the major reason for indigenous 
banking distress in many developing countries is their poor governance structure which has allowed 
insider loans to proliferate. Along these lines, it has been asserted thus:  
 
                                                     
36 See, for instance, Bayraktar and Wang (2004, p.4). See also Cihak and Podpiera (2005, p.3) and Classens et al (2001, 
p.892). 
37 Cihak and Podpiera (2005, p.5).  
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The single biggest contributor to the bad loans of many of the failed local banks was insider 
lending. ... Most of the larger local bank failures in Kenya, such as the Continental Bank, Trade 
Bank and Pan African Bank, involved extensive insider lending, often to politicians… Insider loans 
accounted for 65percent of the total loans of the four local banks liquidated in Nigeria in 1995, 
virtually all of which was unrecoverable…. Almost half of the loan portfolio of one of the Ugandan 
local banks taken over by the BOU in 1995 had been extended to its directors and employees38. 
 
The lesson from the above experiences is that local financial institutions do not grow simply because 
foreign financial institutions are stifled. Strengthening bank governance standards should be of more 
concern to regulators in such developing countries. Based on the above, it is not surprising that a 
2001 study that investigated how foreign bank entry impacted upon domestic banking markets across 
80 countries concluded that “in the long run, foreign bank entry may improve the functioning of 
national banking markets, with positive welfare implications for banking customers39”. 
 
4. The belief that foreign banks may serve as conduits for the outflow of capital through 
money or capital market transactions to the detriment of capital account of a country  
 
This is yet another unfounded belief. This is so for two main reasons. First, the financial systems of 
many developing countries are already dominated by foreign banks. Liberalizing the financial systems 
will therefore have little additional impact. The second related reason is the fact that many of these 
developing countries have consistently been net receivers of foreign capital. The African continent is 
no doubt the worst culprit in this regard. It has, for instance, been noted that since 1980, Africa has 
been the region with the weakest domestic resource mobilization record in the world. Based on the 
above, it is not surprising that more that 35 percent of the regions relatively low investment levels have 
been funded from foreign investments. It is also remarkable to note that the above foreign inflows have 
come largely in the form of official development assistance rather than private capital flows40. 
 
Perhaps more important is the fact that it has been empirically established that capital flights in 
developing countries are not always caused by financial liberalization. In a 1998 study of nine African 
countries, for instance, it was concluded that:  
 
African capital flight is determined by, among other things, low domestic deposit rates, high domestic 
inflation rates and expected overvaluation of the domestic currency. It is also found that there is a 
negative and significant relationship between capital flight and an increase in the domestic rate, 
suggesting that financial liberalization includes a reduction in capital flight in the nine sample African 
countries…. [Despite this] financial liberalization policies per se may not be the panacea for reducing 
capital flight Effective policy measures to reduce capital flight in the African context may need much 
deeper and more fundamental changes of the economic and political systems41. 
 
From the above, it is clear that the concern that foreign banks may serve as conduits for the outflow of 
capital through, money or capital market transactions to the detriment of developing countries is 
misplaced. Capital flights in developing countries sometimes go beyond financial liberalization.  
 
5. The belief that the local regulatory agencies are not well equipped to police the complexities 
of the operations of foreign banks 
 
                                                     
38 Brownbridge, 1998, p.16. See also Browbridge (1998, p.179).  
39 Claessens et al, (2001, p. 908). 
40 Serieux (2008, p.1).  
41 Lensink et al (1998, p.1363-4).  
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Fears over the inability of regulatory agencies in developing countries to effectively regulate the 
activities of foreign banks are no doubt logical. It would for instance be unrealistic to expect regulatory 
agencies in many of such developing countries to have the necessary skills to regulate financial 
practices and products they know little about. Luckily for the majority of developing countries, the 
shallowness of their financial markets has thus far ensured that this loophole has not led to any major 
disaster. It would have been logical to at least hypothesize that the global financial crisis would have 
easily been transmitted to most developing countries through the activities of international banks. This 
has however not been so. This was because the sub prime financial securities that led to the global 
financial crisis were too complex for the relatively unsophisticated financial markets of several 
developing countries. What regulatory agencies in many of such developing countries should be more 
concerned about is the growing threat to their financial systems that is emerging from the inside of 
their various continents as a consequence of their regionalization. 
 
Across all continents, regional integration bodies and free trade agreements are coming into place. 
The 1991 Treaty which established the African Economic Community, for instance, made explicit the 
direction of expected financial and economic integration and cooperation in the continent. Specifically, 
it stated thus:  
 
Member States shall, within a time-table to be determined by the Assembly, harmonize their 
monetary, financial and payments policies, in order to boost intra-community trade in goods and 
services, to further the attainment of objectives of the Community and to enhance monetary and 
financial co-operation among Member States… To this end, Member States shall: (a) Use their 
national currencies in the settlement of commercial and financial transactions in order to reduce 
the use of external currencies in such transactions; (b) Establish appropriate mechanisms for 
setting up multilateral payments systems; (c) Consult regularly among themselves on monetary 
and financial matters; (d) Promote the creation of national, regional and sub-regional money 
markets, through the co-ordinated establishment of stock exchanges and harmonising legal texts 
regulating existing stock exchanges with a view to making them more effective. (e) Cooperate in 
an effective manner in the fields of insurance and banking… Member States shall ensure the free 
movement of capital within the Community through the elimination of restrictions on the transfer 
of capital funds between Member States in accordance with a timetable to be determined by the 
Council42. 
 
Also, the African Union Charter states that “The Union shall have the following financial institutions 
whose rules and regulations shall be defined in protocols relating thereto:(a) The African Central 
Bank;(b) The African Monetary Fund;(c) The African Investment Bank43”. Across the continent, various 
sub regional economic groupings are gradually being strengthened44. Despite the above, very little has 
been done with respect to the design and operationalisation of an effective continental financial 
system regulation structure for the region. Although technical meetings are ritually organised among 
bankers and central bankers from the various countries of the continent, no effective regional financial 
operations and regulatory framework has been developed. 
 
                                                     
42 Articles 44 and 45 
43 Article 19. Recently, Nigerian signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the African Union to host the proposed African 
Central bank. The Bank is expected to commence operations in 2021 (ThisDay, April 27, 2009).   
44 “Current African integration arrangements can be divided into two broad groups: those that fit into the Lagos Plan of Action 
(LPA) adopted in April 1980, and those that were either in existence or came about outside the LPA ….The Lagos Plan was 
promoted by the ECA and launched in a special initiative by the OAU. It envisaged three regional arrangements aimed at the 
creation of separate but convergent and over-arching integration arrangements in three sub-Saharan sub-regions. West Africa 
would be served by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) which pre-dated the Lagos Plan. A 
Preferential Trade Area (PTA) was established in 1981 to cover the countries of East and Southern Africa, which was eventually 
replaced in 1993 by the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). For Central Africa the treaty of the 
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) was approved in 1983…. Together with the Arab Maghreb Union 
(AMU) in North Africa, these arrangements were expected to lead to an all-African common market by the year 2025. The Lagos 
Plan was followed up in 1991 by the Abuja Treaty, re-affirming the commitment of the OAU’s Heads of State to an integrated 
African economy…. In April 2001, African Heads of State launched the African Union at Sirte to replace the OAU” (Mathews, 
2003, Chapter 6).  See also Uche (2001b).  
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While the above status quo had not mattered in the past especially given the not very substantial 
economic and financial linkages between the various African countries, recent developments now call 
for a change in direction. Arguably the single most important factor that has promoted intra African 
capital movement was the establishment of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in 
2001. The NEPAD scheme was essentially championed by the business community in Africa’s largest 
economy: South Africa, with the objective of using it as a spearhead to expand South African capital to 
other parts of the African continent. Given its origins, it is not surprising that NEPAD adopted a neo 
liberal economic approach that emphasises the supremacy of market forces in economic dealings 
within the continent45. 
 
Partly as a result of the above development, South African banks have either been established or 
strengthened in several African countries. Absa Bank for example have subsidiary/ associated banks 
in Mozambique, Tanzania and Angola while Standard Bank  has subsidiary/ associated banks in 
thirteen sub-Saharan African countries.  First Rand Bank also has subsidiaries/ associated banks in 
Botswana, Swaziland and Mozambique. The bank has also been cleared by both the South African 
and Zambian regulatory authorities to establish a full fledged bank in Zambia.  
 
Private Banks from Nigeria, which is the continent’s most populous country, with no explicit strategic 
framework, have also been expanding their operations and capital to other parts of the African 
continent. This has no doubt been boosted by the recent consolidation exercise in the Nigerian 
banking sector. Access Bank, for instance, has subsidiaries in Cote D’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Gambia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Zambia while Zenith Bank has subsidiaries in Sierra 
Leone and Ghana. The magnitude and speed of Nigerian banking investments abroad has made one 
commentator to enthusiastically assert thus:  
 
Nigerian banks have become major players in the global financial market with many of them 
establishing subsidiaries and branches outside the country. The race for Nigerian banks to 
establish subsidiaries and branches abroad is on. The banks are gradually breaking into foreign 
countries, especially in the Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS, Southern 
and Central Africa, Europe and America. As at September 23, ten out of the 24 licensed 
commercial banks in Nigeria own at least a full-fledged licensed bank in a foreign country. These 
Nigerian banks are First Bank of Nigeria, FBN, Union Bank of Nigeria, UBN; Bank 
Intercontinental; Access Bank; Platinum Habbib Bank; Bank PHB and the United Bank for Africa, 
UBA. Others are Guaranty Trust Bank, GTB; Zenith Bank and Oceanic Bank. The last to make 
the list is FinBank, formerly First Inland Bank, which announced on September 22, presence in 
the Gambia through the acquisition of the Arab Gambian Islamic Bank46. 
 
A consequence of the above developments is the increasing financial linkages of the African 
countries. The stark implication of such cross border financial investments is that it is now becoming 
increasingly easier to transmit financial viruses from one developing country to another. There is thus 
an urgent need to develop a robust framework for the regulation of these multinational African financial 
institutions. This is even more critical given the wide variations in the economies of some of the 
various African countries.  
 
  
                                                     
45 See Ezeoha and Uche (2004). 
46 Newswatch Magazine, October 7, 2008. 
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Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
The essence of this paper has been to review the debate and practice of financial liberalization with 
special focus on developing countries. It shows how international developments have led to the 
promotion of financial sector liberalization by the International Monetary Fund and developed 
countries. These policies have been adopted by developing countries with sometimes disastrous 
consequences which have been due mainly to poor planning and sequencing. Despite its limitations, 
financial liberalization will aid the economic development of developing countries more than the failed 
practice of financial repression. The way forward therefore will be for developing countries to devise 
ways of curtailing the excesses of these liberalization measures. Arguably the most important need in 
this direction is for such countries to properly sequence their financial liberalization process. The first 
logical step in in implementing financial liberalization policies would be for such economies to ensure 
macroeconomic stability by bringing inflation under control. This is the major explanatory variable 
between the divergent results of financial liberalization in Africa and Asia. This has been explained 
thus: 
 
Macroeconomic stability is a prerequisite for successful financial liberalization. In the generally 
successful Asian cases, macroeconomic imbalances were largely eliminated before financial 
reforms were introduced. Balance of payments and fiscal deficits were manageable, and inflation 
was relatively low. .. The situation is markedly different in Africa, where a number of countries 
have attempted to implement financial liberalization in an environment of ongoing inflation – 
largely a consequence of excessive fiscal deficits. In Ghana, inflation was more than 20 percent a 
year when interest rates was deregulated; in Zambia, inflation exceeded 100 percent at the time 
of reform, Attaining low but positive interest rates is difficult when inflation is high and volatile47. 
 
Aside from the above, there is also need for countries to develop strong institutions before embarking 
on financial liberalization. There is no doubt widespread agreement that financial liberalization is more 
likely to lead to banking crisis in countries with weak governance structures, high levels of corruption, 
ineffective contract enforcement mechanisms, inadequate prudential regulation and supervision of 
commercial banks and inefficient bureaucracies48. 
 
A stable macroeconomic environment and the development of strong governance institutions are 
therefore essential prerequisites that should be put in place before developing countries begin to 
liberalize foreign participation in their domestic banking markets and deregulate interest rates. All 
developing countries however need to consider the issue of capital account liberalization very 
carefully. At the very least, it is widely accepted that this should be the very last phase of financial 
sector liberalization49. Theoretically, premature opening up of the capital account could undermine the 
liberalization process by giving rise to either inflation or appreciation of the home currency which may 
harm the export sector50. It could also expose the currencies of developing countries to all manner of 
speculative attacks. The financial crises in Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia in the 1990s, 
was at least in part caused by the speculative attacks on the currencies of these Asian countries. This 
was no doubt made possible by capital account liberalization51. The magnitude of the Asian financial 
                                                     
47 Pill and Pradhan (1997, p.8). With respect to Africa, it has also further been noted that the problems of poor loans quality 
faced by the local banks were compounded by macroeconomic instability. Periods of high and very volatile inflation occurred in 
Kenya (46 percent), Nigeria (70 percent) and Uganda (230 percent) during the financial liberalisation period (Brownbridge, 
1998, p.20). See also Ahmed and Suardi (2009, p.1625).  
48  Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998, p.6).  See also Fry (1997, p.759).  
49 It is widely agreed that the sequencing should be as follows: (1) establishment of macroeconomic stability in order to get fiscal 
deficits under control (2) the development of financial markets and institutions to foster competition and (3) deregulation of 
interest rates and elimination of controls (Inanga and Ekpenyong  (2003) and Bayractar and Wang (2004, p.6).  
50 Seck and Nil (1993, p.1874).  
51 “With too many [Thai] baht chasing too few dollars, there was huge pressure for devaluation. The scent of panic attracted 
currency speculators… The Bank of Thailand initially d\sought to defend the baht position by dumping its dollar reserves on the 
market, but by July 2, after loosing at least 9 million USD of its 39 billion dollar reserves, it had to throw in the towel. Speculators 
spotted similar skirtish behaviour among foreign investors in Manila, Kuala Lumpur, and Jakarta, where the same conjunction of 
commercial bank overexposure in real estate, weak export growth, and a widening current account deficit was stoking fears of a 
currency devaluation that could devastate their investments. By October 1 [of 1977], the Philippine Peso, the Malaysian Ringgit, 
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crises was no doubt enormous52. It is instructive that Asian countries like China and India which did 
not have significant capital account convertibility were relatively sheltered from the Asian financial 
crisis53. Since it is widely agreed that this phenomenon, which may be unstoppable, is yet to be fully 
understood, it would be prudent for developing countries, especially given their fragile economies, to 
approach it with great caution and trepidation.  
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